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An employee will often enter into a noncompetition agreement with
his employer under which the employee's right to work for a competitor,
or engage in a certain type of business, is restricted after his current
employment is terminated.' Usually such an agreement restricts the
employee's right to engage in a similar business within a certain geo-
graphic area for a period of time and prohibits the employee from solic-
iting customers he dealt with while working for his former employer.
Although such an agreement does not completely restrict the em-
ployee's future work options, its restrictions could be so onerous that
the employee will remain with his current employer rather than attempt
to engage in business elsewhere. Occasionally the restrictions of such
an agreement are absolute, completely prohibiting the employee from
ever engaging in the business anywhere.
2
Under the common law, an employee noncompetition agreement is
a restraint of trade, for it is "a promise [which in] its performance would
limit competition in any business or restrict the promisor in the exercise
* A.B. 1985, Princeton University;J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for
comments from Professor Steven Shavell and for support from theJohn M. Olin Founda-
tion through the Harvard Program on Law and Economics. The opinions expressed
herein remain solely my own.
1. There are no modem surveys that gauge the extent to which noncompetition
agreements are used in the employment context. One older study revealed that of 86
corporations surveyed in 1965, 83 attempted to protect trade secrets through contractual
arrangements with employees. 12 Bus. ORGANIZATIONS § 3.02, at 3-8 (1983), cited by Phil-
lip J. Clossius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The CurrentJudicialEnforcement
of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal For Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531, 532
(1984).
The case law shows that employee noncompetition agreements have been used in a
large variety of occupations. See 43 A.L.R. 2d 94 & Supp. 1991 (organizing the case law of
restrictive employment agreements by occupation, with categories for accountant, barber
and beauty specialist, bill collector, business executive, construction company, driver for
hire, employment agency, engineer, exterminator, house-to-house salesman, insurance
agent, management consultant, managerial personnel, office worker, optician, optome-
trist, performer, physician, photographer, real-estate agent, repairman, salesman, stenog-
rapher, stockbroker, teacher, technician, tree surgeon, undertaker, veterinarian.
Occupations in the miscellaneous category include pilot, real-estate appraiser, and cook.).
For a thorough compilation of modem cases that indicates occupations affected by restric-
tive employment agreements, see Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 669, App. B (1982).
2. Such an agreement would certainly be an unreasonable restraint of trade and
either voided or modified by a court. See, e.g., Nature House, Inc. v. Sloan, 515 F. Supp
398 (N.D. Il. 1981); Guffey v. Shelnut & Assoc., Inc., 278 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. 1981). Presum-
ably, employers use such agreements either out of ignorance of the law or in an effort to
intimidate unsophisticated employees.
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of a gainful occupation." 3 Naked restraints of trade-i.e., agreements
whose sole purpose is to limit competition-are invalid under the com-
mon law.4 An employee noncompetition agreement, however, is not a
naked restraint of trade because the agreement is ancillary to the offer
and acceptance of employment, an otherwise valid transaction. In the
absence of an employment relationship, the employer would not pay an
individual for his promise to restrict his work options; conversely, with-
out such a promise, the employer might not hire the individual.
The common law does not regard as per se unreasonable an agree-
ment that restrains trade but is part of an otherwise valid transaction.5
A court will only strike down or modify such an agreement upon a find-
ing of unreasonableness based on the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the transaction. In determining whether an employee non-
competition agreement is reasonable under the circumstances, courts
use a "rule of reason" analysis under which an employee noncompeti-
tion agreement will be deemed enforceable if it imposes no greater re-
striction than is needed to protect the legitimate interests of the
employer. In this regard, courts frequently cite the following three part
balancing test: an employee noncompetition agreement will be enforce-
able if (1) it is no more restrictive than needed to protect the employer's
legitimate interest, and the employer's need is not outweighed by (2) the
hardship imposed on the employee and (3) any likely injury to the pub-
lic.6 Although courts often employ this test, any consideration of hard-
ship to the employee and injury to the public is usually subsumed by the
analysis of the employer's protectable interest. That is, the main issue
courts examine is whether the employer has a legitimate interest and
whether the agreement is not overbroad in light of that interest. Once
that hurdle is passed, a court will rarely, if ever, reject an agreement on
grounds of employee hardship or injury to the public.
7
A determination of what constitutes the legitimate, protectable in-
terests of the employer and whether the restrictive covenant is narrowly
tailored to protect those interests, is, as would be expected, very depen-
dent on the specific facts of each case. In general, an employer is
deemed to have a legitimate interest if a noncompetition agreement is
being used to prevent an employee from using confidential business in-
formation or customer contacts in competition against the employer.
8 If
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981).
4. Id. § 187.
5. Id. §§ 187, 188(2)(b).
6. Id. § 188(1).
7. One exhaustive survey concluded that "the common law treats undue hardship
and public injury as the general rubric for characterizing overbroad noncompetition cove-
nants as unreasonable" and that "[plublic injury or personal hardship alone have never
been dispositive elements for not enforcing noncompetition covenants otherwise reason-
able in purpose, geographic scope, and duration." Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 1, at
719, 73 1. See also Harlen M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
649 (1960).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRATS § 188 cmt. b (1981); Lessner Dental Lab.,
Inc. v. Kidney, 492 P.2d 39 (Ariz. 1971); New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 363
N.E.2d 526, 528 (Mass. 1977); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 486 (Mass.
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a court does find a protectable interest, the restrictive covenant is en-
forceable as written only if it is no broader than necessary to prevent the
employee from using the information or customer contacts in a manner
that damages the business of the employer.9
For an illustration of an agreement that was held to be reasonable
and not overbroad, consider Amdar, Inc. v. Satterwhite,10 in which a dance
studio successfully enjoined a former employee from becoming an in-
structor at a competing studio in violation of a noncompetition agree-
ment. The court upheld the agreement under which the employee had
promised not to accept employment for compensation in ajob related to
dance instruction for one year and within tWenty-five miles of the studio.
In enforcing the agreement, the court noted that the defendant had "ob-
tained benefits of compensation, further training and practice and con-
tinued knowledge of and experience in the secrets and methods of
plaintiff's business."'" The court also stated that the plaintiff had
demonstrated the loss of one customer to the defendant's new employer
and the possibility of further loss. 12
In Johnson v. Lee,' 3 the defendant, an office equipment repairman,
had signed an employment agreement with the plaintiff in 1968 under
which the defendant agreed to refrain from competitive business within
fifty miles of Valdosta, Georgia, for a period of five years after his em-
ployment terminated. When the defendant quit in 1978 and attempted
to open a competing business, his former employer successfully en-
joined him. Upholding the agreement as reasonable, the court noted
that the defendant did have substantial customer contact as well as ac-
cess to customer records that showed when maintenance contracts
would be up for renewal.' 4 The court therefore enjoined the defendant
from working in the business of unpacking, adjusting, installing and
servicing office machines within the geographic and time limitations of
1974). See also Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9J.
LEGAL STUD. 683, 685 (1980); Handier & Lazaroff, supra note 1, at 729. But see Angela M.
Cerino, A Talent is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Toward a Workable Solution to the Problem of Restric-
tive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 24 Dug. L. REv. 777, 809 (1986) (While the courts of
"many states, such as Pennsylvania, give lip service to the notion of nonenforcement of
restrictions that are unnecessary for the protection of the employer's legitimate business
interests, there is no overt consideration given to what those interests actually are - and
are not. There appears to be an assumption that if the employer perceives the restrictions
to be necessary, then they must be necessary."); Clossius & Schaffer, supra note 1, at 544.
9. Frequently, a court will hold that the employer has a protectable interest but that
the geographic, time or activity limitations of the noncompetition agreement are broader
than necessary. Different jurisdictions take different approaches to enforcement in this
case. In some, the whole agreement will be declared unenforceable. In others, the court
will excise unreasonable provisions if they are severable from the contract and enforce the
remaining provisions. In some jurisdictions, the court will modify the contract without
attempting to sever the unreasonable provisions. For a discussion of these three ap-
proaches, seeJeffery G. Groody, Note, Partial Enforcement of Post-Employment Restrictive Cove-
nants, 15 CoLuM.J. L. & Soc. PROB. 181, 196-214 (1979).
10. 246 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. App. 1978).
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id. at 168.
13. 257 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 1979).
14. Id. at 275.
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his noncompetition agreement.1 5
Behnke v. Hertz Corp. 16 is an example of a case in which there is no
legitimate, protectable interest of the employer. Behnke hired Kreft to
work as a clerk at a car rental desk in the Milwaukee airport. Kreft
signed an agreement stating: "I agree not to work for any car rental
competitor in the city of Milwaukee for one year if and when the present
job is terminated." When Kreft quit her job to work for Hertz, Behnke
sued Hertz for inducing Kreft to breach her contract and won $982 com-
pensatory and $10,000 punitive damages. On appeal, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed. 17 The court noted that since there was no
evidence that Kreft could take trade secrets or customers away from the
plaintiff, the restrictive covenant was unnecessary for the protection of
the employer and hence unreasonable.'
8
It should be noted that in a few jurisdictions, statutes have dis-
placed or limited the common law. In Louisiana, for example, an em-
ployee cannot be contractually restricted for more than two years from
competing against a former employer. 19 In Colorado, all employee cov-
enants not to compete are void, with some exceptions, e.g., a "contrac-
tual provision providing for recovery of the expense of educating and
training an employee who has served an employer for a period of less
than two years."'20 In California, all employee noncompetition agree-
ments are void.2 ' More commonly, states that address the issue merely
codify existing common law.22
In evaluating the current state of the law in this area, academics
have reached sharply different conclusions. Those who believe that con-
tracts made in a free market enhance the contracting parties' welfare
argue that these contracts should be subject to regular contract law and
not to a reasonableness test.2 3 Under that approach, almost all em-
ployee noncompetition agreements would be upheld. Others argue that
an employer's legitimate interests are already protected by trade secret
and principal-agent law and that noncompetition agreements therefore
give employers no protection beyond what they already have. Under
this view, noncompetition agreements are not used to protect the em-
ployer's legitimate interests, but rather to intimidate workers from going
15. Id.
16. 235 N.W.2d 690 (Wis. 1975).
17. Although the verdict was reversed on appeal, the fact that the plaintiff could get
the case before a jury and win large damages supports the contention of those who claim
that noncompetition agreements, even unreasonable ones, create enough uncertainty in
the minds of employees and future employers that these agreements unnecessarily inhibit
mobility and deter competition. Therefore, some claim that all noncompetition agree-
ments should be prohibited. The employer would still receive protection from unfair com-
petition through trade secret and agency law.
18. Behnke, 235 N.W.2d at 693.
19. 16 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (1990).
21. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987).
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. § 103.465 (West 1988).
23. Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassess-
ment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1985).
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into competition.
24
This Paper focuses on the dynamics of the bargain between em-
ployer and employee and measures the impact of a noncompetition
agreement on the welfare of the contracting parties and society. Part II
makes some preliminary remarks about the economic approach that will
be used. Part III discusses four reasons why an employer and employee,
under perfect competition, might enter into a noncompetition agree-
ment. It addresses, for each reason, the potential gain from trade and
whether market imperfections lead to sub-optimal agreements. Where
appropriate, the question of whether an agreement's anticompetitive as-
pects diminish social welfare is also addressed. Part IV summarizes the
conclusions reached and outlines a rational legal regime.
II. ECONOMIC APPROACH
In a perfect market, a freely made contract will increase the overall
welfare of all parties involved. This conclusion stems from the basic
principle that a person will only engage in a trade if he feels the trade
will make him better off-that is, if there are gains to be made from the
trade. The economist's traditional support of free markets is a result of
the welfare-enhancing nature of trade.
One conventional definition states that a market is perfect when the
following five conditions are met: (1) all buyers and sellers are atomistic
(no individual can affect the price of the good through large sales or
purchases); (2) there are no externalities (all costs and benefits are re-
flected in the price of the good); (3) there is free mobility of resources
(with costless entry and exit from the market); (4) all parties have perfect
information (they know exactly what the bargain entails); and (5) the
product in the market is homogeneous (all products are identical, so
buyers choose a seller based solely on price).
Trade in a given market will not maximize welfare if one of these
five criteria is not met. In that case, government intervention may be
justified, whether by statutory or judicial regulation of trades, govern-
ment efforts to supply information to the market or the taxation of be-
havior that produces externalities. In addition, if a certain type of
bargain will lead to imperfect competition in the future, government in-
tervention is necessary. For example, it is widely accepted that govern-
ments should prohibit agreements that lead to cartels even though the
agreement is beneficial to the contracting parties.
It is commonly agreed among economists that labor markets are not
perfect. 25 Wages tend to be sticky and do not fluctuate with short-term
swings in supply and demand, as one would expect in a perfect market.
Because of sticky wages, periods of excessive unemployment often oc-
cur, even though perfect competition would suggest that this is impossi-
24. Clossius & Schaffer, supra note 1.
25. For a general discussion of how the labor market differs from a perfectly competi-
tive market, see LESTER C. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF EcONOMICS
173-215 (1983).
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ble. In addition, monopsonistic buyers of labor exist in some
communities, a problem made possible by the lack of easy and costless
labor mobility.
Nevertheless, in analyzing the efficiency of noncompetition agree-
ments, it is useful to start with the presumption that perfect competition
exists and that noncompetition agreements enhance the welfare of both
the employer and employee. The next section begins, therefore, with
the presumption that whatever value the employer gains from a non-
competition agreement (e.g., assurance that employees won't use secrets
or customer contacts in competition, or assurance that employees won't
quit frequently due to the difficulty they will have transferring their
skills) exceeds whatever loss the employee incurs as a result of hindered
mobility. Under this assumption, because the gain to the employer ex-
ceeds the loss to the employee, the employer will be able to compensate
the employee-in salary or training or in some other manner-by an
amount that more than covers the employee's loss.
This starting point forces identification of what both parties hope to
gain from such an agreement. Once a potential gain from trade under
perfect competition is identified, it is possible to consider whether a
market imperfection leads, in fact, to sub-optimal trades or whether the
agreement itself causes a market imperfection going forward and should
therefore be prohibited.
III. A WELFARE ANALYSIS OF FOUR POTENTIAL GAINS FROM TRADE
Academics have identified four potential gains provided by em-
ployee noncompetition agreements. These gains stem from bargains
over employee goodwill, the disclosure of business secrets, the under-
taking of expensive training by the employer and the stabilization of
wages. Although for analytic purposes we will examine each gain sepa-
rately, in any particular case the bargain may involve more than one of
these reasons.
A. Employee Goodwill
Often an employee enhances a firm's value in a way that depends on
the employee's continuing presence. For example, customers may grow
to like and trust an employee enough that they would follow him if he
moved to another firm or started his own business. Even in the absence
of customer contact, an employee's consistent presence can help lift the
productivity of all workers-high employee turnover is usually associ-
ated with low productivity, partly because people work best together
when they have had time to develop a team mentality.
2 6
The value that an employee adds to a firm by his presence may be
called employee goodwill, just as a business name or location is said to
have goodwill. Some analysts argue that an employer pays a wage to an
employee to develop employee goodwill. Not only would it be wrong to
26. Id. at 205.
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allow the employee to leave the firm and appropriate the goodwill for
himself by taking customers or employing trade secrets elsewhere, but
the prospect of such a departure could chill the employer's desire to hire
the employee in the first place.27 In this analysis, noncompetition agree-
ments are justified as enabling an employee to sell goodwill to an em-
ployer for a wage, just as a noncompetition agreement enables the
owner of a business to sell his business's goodwill.28
Many noncompetition agreements are entered into, and upheld by
courts, specifically to protect an employer's interest in employee good-
will. For example, often an employee covenants that after termination
of his employment he will not solicit customers with whom he came into
regular contact. 29 Even in the absence of such an explicit covenant,
courts often uphold agreements with geographic restrictions on the em-
ployee's post-employment activity if the restriction corresponds to the
geographic range of the employee's customer contact.30 Hence, it is im-
portaht to analyze carefully whether a noncompetition agreement in this
context actually maximizes social welfare.
Our analysis of the labor market indicates that no employee with
perfect information will enter into a noncompetition agreement in order
to sell his employee goodwill. By restricting attractive employment op-
portunities in the future, a noncompetition agreement forces a prospec-
tive employee to make a long-term commitment to a firm. Only if an
employee underestimates the value of the goodwill he will bring to or
develop at a firm will he be willing to enter into such a long-term
contract.
In an efficient market, employees earn a return equal to their margi-
nal revenue product of labor (MRP), which is the increase in revenue
that a firm experiences when it hires an additional employee but holds
all other inputs of production constant.31 If by hiring an additional em-
ployee, but adding absolutely nothing else, a firm's revenues increase by
$X per year (i.e., $X is the employee's marginal revenue product), then,
27. Cerino, supra note 8 at 807.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Group Ass'n Plans, Inc. v. Colquhoun, 292 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1968),
vacated on other grounds, 466 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (enforcing restrictive covenant that
barred insurance broker from soliciting business from concerns that were his employer's
customers during his term of employment).
30. See, e.g., Marshall v. Covington, 339 P.2d 504 (Idaho 1959) (enforcing restrictive
covenant between medical clinic and physician requiring physician not to practice
medicine or surgery for three years within twenty-five miles of clinic if physician left clinic
for any reason, noting that the territorial scope of a restrictive covenant is reasonable if
not broader than the territory throughout which the employee established contact with the
employer's customers); Standard Register Co. v. D.C. Kerrigan, 119 S.E.2d 533 (S.C.
1961) (enforcing noncompetition agreement in which sales representative coveted that for
two years after leaving employer he would not sell, in competition with employer, to ac-
counts or in territory in which he performed duties for employer).
31. The conclusion that an employee's wage equals his marginal revenue product (i.e.,
his contribution to the firm's revenue) holds true only when the firm incurs no additional
capital costs by hiring the employee. If additional capital costs are incurred, the em-'
ployee's wage will equal his marginal revenue product discounted by an amount to cover a
fair rate of return on the additional capital required.
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under perfect competition, the employee will be compensated $X per
year.3 2 If he were paid less than $X per year, it would be profitable for a
competing firm to hire the employee at a slightly higher wage. This pro-
cess would continue until an equilibrium wage of $X was reached. An
employee's contribution to a firm's revenues includes the revenue re-
sulting from the employee goodwill he develops. In a perfect market,
therefore, a worker will always be fully compensated for his employee
goodwill.
A simple illustration will demonstrate this. Suppose that I am a
haircutter and have just started working in a hair salon. Assume that
because of the vast size of the salon and the large supplies it has on
hand, the salon incurs no additional costs when my presence is added
(while this is clearly an unrealistic assumption, it leads to clarity of expo-
sition with no change in conclusion).3 3 Suppose I know that after a
short time with the salon I will generate $40,000 worth of business on an
annualized basis. Of this amount, $25,000 will represent revenue from
customers who like and trust me and will move to another shop if I
move. The value of my employee goodwill will therefore be $25,000.
The other $15,000 will be revenue derived from walk-in customers or
customers who like the shop and its location. Thus, $15,000 of my reve-
nue will result from business goodwill. Since this is a perfect market,
with perfect information, what will my salary be? It must be $40,000 per
year.
At this point, one might interject that this can't be the result if the
going salary for haircutters under these circumstances (i.e., when no ad-
ditional capital costs need be incurred by a salon) is, say, $25,000. If
that's the case, one might assert, then the hair salon will refuse to pay
me $40,000 and will find someone else at the going rate of $25,000.
The salon will earn the difference ($15,000) as a supernormal return on
investment. This argument, however, fails to take into account that
$25,000 could not be the equilibrium wage if the cost of haircuts were
such that haircutters generated $40,000 in additional revenues each year
(with no increase in capital costs). Firms would bid the salary up to
$40,000 in an effort to obtain the difference between the salary and the
$40,000 revenue.
Thus, in an efficient market I will always be compensated by an
amount equal to my marginal revenue product. The portion of my reve-
nue that results from employee goodwill is irrelevant to this determina-
tion. With perfect information, I will have no desire to enter into a
noncompetition agreement, which will restrict my mobility, unless I am
compensated by more than my MRP. But no employer would ever agree
32. Some may find it counter-intuitive that an employee could earn his contribution to
revenues, for it then appears that the firm reaps no benefit. This result is based on the
economist's definition of "zero" or "normal" profits as profits that provide a fair rate of
return on capital given the risk to which the capital is exposed. That is, if the return on
capital is no greater than the return that could be gained in other ventures of equal risk,
then the firm is said to earn normal (or zero) economic profits.
33. See supra note 3 1.
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to pay a wage that exceeded my contribution to revenues. Hence, if the
salon and I are willing to enter into an employment agreement, which
contains a noncompetition clause, either the salon has overestimated my
contribution to its revenues (my MRP) or I have overestimated it. One
of us is operating with imperfect information.
For a number of reasons, it is reasonable to assume that it is the
employee who systematically miscalculates his MRP. The firm deals with
many employees and is, therefore, more familiar with the marginal reve-
nue product of labor. In the case where additional capital inputs are
required, the firm also has more information about the quantity and cost
of such inputs. Most importantly, if a firm did systematically overesti-
mate employee goodwill, and thus was able to induce workers to enter
long-term contracts by implicit or explicit 34 promises of wages above
MRP, the firm would be driven out of the market by competitors who
operate at a lower cost by not entering into such agreements. Workers,
however, will continue to work, even in the long run, if locked into sub-
optimal wage agreements.
In the hair salon example, this reasoning would apply as follows. As
a new haircutter, I am not as knowledgeable as the salon about the
number of customers I will see each week. Further, I know little about
the cost of renting and running a shop. Thus, I cannot accurately calcu-
late my contribution to the firm's revenues or a fair discount to cover
associated capital costs. If the firm offers me a salary that appears gener-
ous, but has a noncompetition agreement, I may take it. Later, when I
learn more about the revenues and costs associated with running a sa-
lon, I will want to leave because I will realize that my salary is sub-opti-
mal. At that point, however, I will be immobilized by the
noncompetition agreement.
To summarize the above argument: It is not to an individual's ad-
vantage to restrict his mobility unless he is promised more than what he
believes his MRP will be. Since employers have more accurate informa-
tion about the average employee's MRP, and since employers can't re-
main solvent in the long run if they pay employees more than their MRP,
it is unlikely that employers systematically pay excessive wages. Thus,
only employees who underestimate their current or future MRP are will-
ing to restrict their mobility by entering into noncompetition agree-
ments, and as a result they earn suppressed, noncompetitive wages.3 5
34. An explicit wage promise would be a contractual agreement about future wages.
An implicit wage arrangement would be one in which a potential employee examines the
salaries currently being paid to employees of varying tenure. If the employee believes that
the firm must maintain the current wage pattern to preserve its reputation in the labor
market, he will use the current wage pattern as a reliable indication of the wages he can
expect in the future.
35. Under pure competition, an employee would know his MRP just by looking at
competitive wages (e.g., learning what other hair salons pay starting haircutters). Clearly,
market imperfections or anomalies prevent the employee from learning what his competi-
tive wage should be. This paper will not examine those imperfections, except for two
speculations:
(1) The market has devolved to a state where all employers offer noncompetiuon em-
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Thus, noncompetition agreements are not the result of the efficient
sale by rational workers of their employee goodwill, and these agree-
ments cannot be analogized, though some commentators have tried,3 6
to the sale of business goodwill by firms. In fact, employees are only
assured of receiving a fair price for their goodwill if they retain the right
to move whenever their wages do not reflect their MRP.
3 7
Some may argue that if the sale of employee goodwill through the
use of noncompetition agreements was prohibited, employees would be
able to expropriate value that was due not to their contribution, but to
the employer's. Thus, in the haircutter example, one might argue that it
is unjust for the employee to use the employer's facilities and capital
investment to build a loyal clientele that will follow the employee when
he leaves. To accept such an argument, however, is to be led down a
slippery slope with no logical stopping point. Certainly, all workers en-
hance their human capital and become more valuable through work ex-
perience, and workers are willing to accept wages that do not reflect
their full contribution to a firm if they are developing general skills that
enhance their value.3 8 But, any general increase in value from on-the-
job experience cannot justify indentured servitude. To say that a hair-
cutter unjustly expropriates value from his firm when he leaves with
$25,000 worth of customers is the same, analytically, as saying that a
journalist (or banker or lawyer) who was hired for $15,000 per year but
is now worth $40,000 should not be permitted to leave his firm if a com-
petitor offers a salary more commensurate with the individual's current
value to firms.
B. Business Secrets
1. Effect on the Contracting Parties
Sometimes a firm's profitability depends in part on secret processes
or formulas used by the firm. The firm may be able to expand its output
most efficiently if it can teach new employees these secrets. If, however,
ployment contracts at suppressed wages. This would explain why individuals enter into
noncompetition agreements but would not justify their prevalence.
(2) The labor market is not a spot market in which all workers have the same produc-
tivity and earn the exact same wage. Employees have varying levels of productivity based
on their innate ability; further, an employee's productivity will change over time (presuma-
bly it will rise). At the time the employee enters a long-term contract he is trying to pre-
dict his innate and future productivity and judge the long-term wage offer against that
estimate. There is no easily available market information that will help the employee earn
a fair wage under these circumstances. The employer is in a much better situation to
estimate the average worker's present and future productivity. For a general discussion of
how individuals make decisions under uncertainty, see Amos Tversky and Daniel
KahnemanJudgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS
19 (Peter Diamond & Michael Rothschild eds., 1978).
36. See, e.g., Cerino, supra note 8, at 807.
37. It is important to note that this conclusion does not diminish the possibility that
employees might have other rational reasons to enter noncompetition agreements, e.g.,
obtaining expensive training, communicating business secrets or stabilizing wages. These
possibilities are examined in the sections that follow.
38. This conclusion, which is widely accepted by economists, is discussed more fully
below.
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the employer fears that employees will leave the firm and use confiden-
tial information at a competing firm, the employer may decide to limit
the number of employees and forego expanding output. Alternatively,
the employer's response to a fear of disclosure may be to expand output
but expend resources to prevent employees from fully understanding
the firm's secrets. For example, the firm could carefully divide work
among different classes of employees to make sure that no single em-
ployee understands "the big picture," even if this work flow is not the
most efficient.3 9 In either event, the firm's profits are below what they
would be if the firm could just reveal the secrets to employees without
fearing that employees will "steal" the information.
It is true that some confidential business information will be given
"trade secret" status under the law. As defined in the Restatement of Torts,
a trade secret is:
[A]ny formula, pattern device or compilation of informa-
tion which is used in one's business and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it....
... Some factors to be considered in determining whether
given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to
which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in
his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information
to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; [and]
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others. 40
A trade secret is generally regarded as taken unlawfully when it is dis-
covered by an improper or deceitful means or its disclosure or use by a
party constitutes a breach of confidence. 4 1 Anyone unlawfully taking a
trade secret, including former employees, can be sued for damages, and
an injunction can be obtained preventing the use of the trade secret.
Trade secret litigation is difficult and risky, however. First, it is diffi-
cult to detect the unlawful use of a trade secret by another party.4 2 The
difficulty of detection is what made the secret possible in the first place.
For example, if the trade secret involves a process for making widgets at
a lower cost than the competition, the process could remain a secret
because simple examination of a widget does not reveal the process, or
perhaps that even some unusual process was used. Therefore, it would
be difficult to discern that a former employee had in fact revealed the
secret process to a competitor and that the competitor was now using it.
In addition, trade secret litigation involves a risk that the secret will
39. Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 97 (1981).
40. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 7 cmt. b (1939).
41. Id.
42. Kitch, supra note 8, at 690.
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be revealed, for the plaintiff must at least reveal the existence of a secret.
Although courts have devised methods for keeping the actual secret
confidential, risk of disclosure is inherent whenever the details of a se-
cret are organized, documented and communicated.
4
A noncompetition agreement enables an employer to reveal trade
secrets to employees more freely. It is easy to detect that an employee
violated a noncompetition agreement and litigation over the contract
entails less risk of trade secret disclosure.44 Because an employer can
increase profits by revealing secrets to employees and expanding out-
put, the employer will desire these agreements.
When an employer is assured by a noncompetition agreement that
confidential information will not be diverted to competitors, the em-
ployer will divulge trade secrets and other confidential business infor-
mation4 5 to an employee. This will raise the employee's MRP, for an
employee to whom secrets can be divulged can be trusted with broader
and more meaningful assignments and will therefore contribute more to
the firm's revenues. Part of this incremental increase in the employee's
value will be used to compensate the employee for giving up a large
degree of mobility. Thus, when noncompetition agreements are used in
a perfect labor market 46 solely to protect trade secrets and confidential
information, the agreement does enhance the welfare of both parties.
It is worthwhile to consider how the increase in profits (resulting
from the incremental increase in a worker's MRP) is divided between the
firm and the employee. Although the employee may know the MRP of
his general skills, he has no way of knowing what the secret is ahead of
time, and no way of knowing, therefore, what his value to the firm will be
when the secret is divulged. Although he will demand to be compen-
sated for the restricted mobility he will incur by signing a noncompeti-
tion agreement (let us call this the immobility premium), he will not know
how much further he can bargain with the firm. Furthermore, in a com-
petitive labor market, he will be unable to ask for more than the immo-
bility premium: if the premium is fair compensation for immobility,
many workers will be willing to accept the job offer.
A simple example will illustrate this. Suppose I am a cook with gen-
eral skills. My marginal revenue product is $15,000; I know my MRP
because it is my competitive wage in a perfect market.4 7 I value mobil-
ity, it gives me the assurance that if my work environment becomes un-
pleasant or if my general skills should become worth more than my
employer can pay, I can move to another restaurant at will. I would be
43. Id. at 691.
44. Id. at 690-9 1.
45. In our discussion, we use the term "business secret" or "confidential business
information" to mean confidential business information in a broad, general sense, whether
or not it would be deemed to be a trade secret under the common law with concomitant
property rights.
46. That is, a market that is perfect in all respects except for the existence of trade
secrets. Under perfect information, of course, secrets could not exist.
47. Again, a market that is perfect except for the existence of restaurants with trade
secrets.
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willing, however, to sacrifice mobility for an extra $3,000 per year. Most
other cooks'have an identical immobility premium.
A restaurant renowned for its expensive but secret-recipe dishes de-
cides to hire another cook to expand its output. The restaurant insists
that any cook hired enter into a noncompetition agreement so that the
restaurant will be assured that its secret recipes are not divulged to com-
petitors. The restaurant knows that, all other things being equal (i.e., no
additional capital is required), the incremental increase in revenue re-
sulting from hiring another cook (the cook's MRP) will be $25,000.
Since the competitive wage for a cook is $15,000, the restaurant will
generate supernormal revenues of $10,000 because it can charge high
prices for the unusual dishes the new cook will prepare.
The firm will only have to pay me $18,000 per year-the value of
my general skills plus the immobility premium. I won't know to ask for
more;4 8 further, if I did insist on more, plenty of other cooks would be
willing to work for $18,000 per year. Thus, the firm will gain $7,000
from entering into the noncompetition agreement and I will gain
$3,000. This arrangement is not unfair to me. I am getting what I con-
sider a beneficial deal or I would not have signed the agreement.
This analysis assumes, of course, a perfect labor market. As the
analysis in the previous section illustrated, there is reason to believe that
employees systematically enter sub-optimal long-term agreements con-
cerning their wage because of asymmetric information about the em-
ployee's initial productivity and probable increase in productivity.
2. Effect on the market
Even though the employer and employee may benefit when they
enter into a noncompetition agreement that makes it possible to more
fully exploit a secret, the agreement is not economically efficient if it
does not maximize social welfare. In this section, the effect of noncom-
petition agreements on the market is examined using the concepts of
consumer and producer surplus. This is an approach heretofore unex-
plored by commentators..
Many commentators have argued that noncompetition agreements
are good because, by assuring firms that they will be able to expand
output while retaining secrets, they give firms an incentive to develop new
processes and ideas and to exploit these innovations. 49 It is certainly true
that enabling firms to derive maximum profits from secrets encourages
them to invest in research and exploit unique findings. That does not,
however, answer the question of whether, on balance, the increase in
research and exploitation improves social welfare by more than the loss
caused by the introduction of monopolistic competition. The bold as-
48. Although I know the price charged by the restaurant for its dishes, because the
recipes are secret I do not know the cost of preparing the dishes. Thus, I do not know how
much the restaurant earns with each sale. I also do not know how much the restaurant
spends to research and develop its recipes.
49. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 23, at 715.
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sertion made by these commentators has the same analytic merit as say-
ing, without theoretical or empirical backing, that monopolies are good
because the supernormal returns they earn will give them an incentive to
develop new products.
The key to understanding the welfare effects of noncompetition
agreements used to protect business secrets is this: secrets lead to mo-
nopoly power. It is true that many secrets involve the manufacturing of
an existing good by a new low cost method or the provision of a unique
good or service. While society benefits from new goods and lower pro-
duction costs, the introduction of monopoly power leads to inefficient
production decisions.
The following analysis will show that when the motivation for a
noncompetition agreement is to enable a firm to expand output while
retaining a secret, the net effect on social welfare is indeterminate.
One's assumptions about market behavior also drastically affect the pre-
dicted results. For purposes of this analysis, assume that n firms com-
pete in a perfect market and sell a total of q units of a good at a price, P1,
equal to marginal cost, incl. Each firm initially sells an equal amount, q/n
units. Assume further that the marginal cost of each unit is constant
over the relevant production range so that each firm's supply curve is
horizontal. Suppose now that one firm, F, discovers a secret process for
making the good at a lower marginal cost, mc2. (Again, F has a horizon-
tal cost function, but its cost function is now below the prevailing cost
function of other firms.) F must now choose its desired output and
price. In order to expand output, F will have to hire new employees and
reveal the secret process to them.
Two situations must be considered:
(a) Noncompetition agreements are not legal. If noncompetition agree-
ments are not legal, then the firm will fear that employees will "steal"
the idea and reveal it to competitors. In this case, the firm will not hire
additional employees and will keep output at its current level, q/n, and
sell the good at the going price, incl. The firm will make noncompeti-
tive, or supernormal, profits of q/n(mc, - mc 2). Because no change in
consumer surplus results, the only gain to society is the small savings in
resources that come about by Fs production of qin units at a lower
price. That is, the small gain in net social welfare equals Fs profits of q/
n(mc - mc2).
(b) Noncompetition agreements are legal. If noncompetition agreements
are legal and are easily enforceable, then F will be able to hire employ-
ees, expand output, and take over the market. Society will gain in the
sense that more units will now be made at a lower cost than before. As
we will see, however, the monopolistic pricing that may result will cause
inefficiencies. The net effect on social welfare will be indeterminate.
Consider the following two pricing policies. First, imagine that F
can charge a monopoly price, P2, above mc1 . Other firms, which can pro-
duce and sell at mc1 , will fear entering the market because they know that
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F can undercut them at will. 50 The firm will produce units until the
marginal revenue from an additional unit equals the marginal cost of a
unit. In Illustration 1, this will occur at q2 units; the firm will charge P2,
the price which results in a quantity demanded of q2 units. In this case,
consumer surplus will fall from the shaded areas DAB to D. Producer
surplus will rise from nothing to CA. The change in net social welfare
(NSW) will depend on the relative sizes of area B, the deadweight loss
resulting from lost consumer surplus, and area C, the gain resulting
from production at a cost lower than mcl. (Area A represents a transfer
in surplus from consumers to F.) The sizes of areas B and C will depend
on the elasticity of demand and the cost savings enabled by the new
secret process. Under this pricing policy, we cannot categorically say
whether social welfare is improved by allowing noncompetition
agreements.
llustration 1
MCI = inchstry margnal cost




A second policy by F would be to charge a price just below mc in
order to keep competitors out of the market. For ease of exposition, in
Illustration 2 firm F is shown as charging mcl. In this case, there is no
change in consumer surplus. Firm F earns producer surplus equal to
the shaded area B. The gain in net social welfare is equal to B, the sav-
ings that come from producing q units at a lower cost than before.
50. Undercutting by F will not amount to predatory pricing, in violation of the anti-
trust laws, as long as F charges more than its marginal cost of mc 2. Barry Wright Corp. v.
IT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-33 (Ist Cir. 1983).
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Illustration 2
price
MCI = industry marginal cost
P1
MC2 = firm F marginal cost
Marginal Re I enue Demand
i quantity
q
Thus, with respect to the exploitation of business secrets, it is un-
clear whether noncompetition agreements improve net social welfare
because the exploitation of a secret leads to monopoly power. Under
traditional monopoly pricing, the effect on net social welfare is indeter-
minate. If monopolistic competition leads to pricing at just below the
marginal cost of other firms, there is a gain in NSW; it is unclear, how-
ever, whether one can expect this pricing policy.
This Paper will not develop a model of investment in research and
the effect of noncompetition agreements on innovation. It is expected,
however, that a simple model would be even more ambiguous and inde-
terminate than the model for the exploitation of business secrets.
The common law and statutes take a strong stance against restraints
of trade in general, under the theory that the loss to society caused by
monopoly pricing exceeds whatever gain a monopolist or cartel might
conceivably bestow on society as a result of earning supernormal prof-
its.5t Given this strong disapproval of monopoly power, it is curious
that academics and courts have justified noncompetition agreements on
the grounds that they will encourage firms to invest in research and fully
exploit ideas. As shown above, it is difficult to justify this assertion using
simple economic theory. Casual empiricism suggests that the assertion
51. For example, under the federal antitrust statutes the following pro-restraint argu-
ments have been rejected: that a professional society can prohibit competitive bidding by
engineers to prevent low bids that might result in inferior work, National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and that manufacturers of wo-
men's garments can agree among themselves that each manufacturer will boycott any
retail store that sells cheap "knock off' copies of another manufacturer's garments in or-
der to police and deter illegal, tortious acts by retailers, Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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is not true. For example, California, a state known for its vigorous and
innovative high technology industries, does not allow noncompetition
agreements that restrict employees.
5 2
Perhaps noncompetition agreements are accorded special treatment
for a "natural rights" reason. Unlike other restraints, in which a pro-
ducer does nothing of special value but attempts to increase profits
through collusive agreements with other producers, in the case of a non-
competition agreement the producer has done something of value by
creating an idea or process desired by society. Courts and commenta-
tors may feel that one should be allowed to protect this intellectual
property if one is willing to pay others (through higher wages) in order
to maintain sole ownership.
53
On balance, it appears that any loss in social welfare from noncom-
petition agreements related to business secrets is neither great nor sys-
tematic. Clearly, in a well-functioning labor market, employees who
sign noncompetition agreements will benefit from the payment of an
immobility premium. As for the costs and benefits of monopoly power,
simple economic theory shows that net benefits occur in some instances
and net losses in others, depending on the supply and demand curves of
the particular case. This is in contrast to the use of naked restraints of
trade through collusive agreements, in which case there is always a net
loss to society because monopoly pricing is introduced without innova-
tions (low cost production methods, new products) that provide coun-
tervailing benefits.
As shown by the discussion of employee goodwill, there is reason to
believe that employees systematically make sub-optimal decisions when
an agreement calls for an estimate of long-term productivity. A firm has
better information than a new employee about the employee's current
value to the firm as well as the general potential for productivity growth
in the industry. State legislatures might therefore approach an equitable
balance by limiting the term of those noncompetition agreements
designed to protect business secrets so that, after a definite number of
years, an employee would be free to leave the firm and immediately
enter a position of competition against his former employer. For exam-
ple, a noncompetition agreement could have a maximum statutory term
of six years, after which time the employer and employee would be re-
quired to renegotiate the noncompetition agreement. This would im-
pose limits on employers, who might be constrained from imparting
secrets to an employee as the statutory expiration of a noncompetition
agreement approached, but this concern is counterbalanced by the pro-
tection such a statute would afford employees.
52. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987). See also James H. A. Podey, Restric-
tive Employee Covenants in California, 4 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 251
(1988); Kitch, supra note 8, at 710.
53. As noted above, one is given special proprietary rights in trade secrets, but the
nature of trade secrets and traditional remedies make it difficult to prevent the disclosure
of the trade secrets by former employees who join competitors.
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C. Training
Many firms expend significant resources training employees. Fol-
lowing Gary Becker's analysis of human capital,5 4 economists have clas-
sified training in two categories: general training, in which the skills an
employee learns are of value to many competing firms, and specific
training, in which the skills the employee learns are of value only to the
firm doing the training. Teaching a junior bank officer how to analyze
loan requests is an example of general training, for the skills the em-
ployee learns can be utilized at many competing banks. But teaching the
employee how that bank organizes its files and forms is an example of
specific training, for that knowledge is of no use to competitors who
have their own systems in place.
According to Becker, a firm will not subsidize the cost of teaching a
worker general skills because the worker can easily transfer those skills
to another firm. In fact, if the firm did pay for a worker's general train-
ing, after the training the firm would lose the worker to firms that do not
train workers and can therefore afford to pay higher wages. Thus, em-
ployees themselves must pay for general training through wages that are
below the marginal product of labor. For example, if an untrained
worker has a marginal product of labor of $100 per week, and training
costs $20 per week, the employee will accept a wage of $80 per week
during the training period. This assumes, of course, that $20 is an effi-
cient level of training-that is, the present value of the future increase in
productivity is equal to or greater than $20.
An employee will not pay for the cost of specific training, however.
Because specific skills cannot be used at competing firms, an employee's
competitive wage will not rise with an increase in specific skills. There-
fore, firms must pay for all specific training. During and after the train-
ing period, the employee will receive a wage equal to the marginal
productivity of his general skills-his competitive wage. Thus, a novice
cook will accept a depressed salary if he is learning how to prepare
dishes for that training increases his future value. An accomplished
chef, however, will not accept depressed wages to learn how a restau-
rant's kitchen is organized because that specific knowledge does not in-
crease the chef's value to other firms.
In this analysis, there is no need for a long-term contract between
employer and employee. A firm that pays for specific training need not
fear the loss of an employee because the firm can always match compet-
ing wage offers. To retain the employee the firm need only pay the pre-
vailing wage the employee could earn at other firms. This the firm will
gladly do, since it values the employee more highly because of the em-
ployee's specific skills. On the other side of the coin, an employee who
pays for general training through lower wages need not seek a long-term
contract with the employer; after his training, many firms will seek him
out for his general skills and pay him a competitive wage for those skills.
54. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964).
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Becker's analysis is not robust, however, because it fails to take into
account the situation where the cost of general training exceeds the em-
ployee's wage.55 For example, suppose that the cost of training an air-
line pilot is $300,000 per year for three years. Even if this were an
efficient investment, few employees could afford to pay for this training
directly, and none could afford to pay for it by accepting decreased
wages during the training period. Of course, since the ability to pilot a
plane is a general skill desired by competing firms, under Becker's analy-
sis no airline will pay for this training.
If an employee could commit to work the number of years necessary
for the airline to recoup its investment, the airline would then be willing
to make the investment. Such contracts, which smack of indentured ser-
vitude, are not enforceable under the Constitution and the common
law.56 A noncompetition agreement, however, enables the pilot essen-
tially to bind himself to the airline; as long as the airline pays the pilot
more than he could earn in other industries, the pilot will stay with the
airline. Thus, while the pilot cannot enter an enforceable contract that
explicitly requires him to serve the airline for a set number of years, the
pilot can indirectly accomplish much the same result by entering into a
noncompetition agreement. The noncompetition agreement thus in-
duces the employer to make the long-term investment in expensive
training. Gains can be made from investing in training and the em-
ployee and employer can share these gains through higher lifetime
wages and profits.
57
The argument that noncompetition agreements are needed to in-
duce employers to spend large sums training workers has much analytic
merit. One can imagine many situations in which the cost of general
training is so high that employees cannot pay for the training either di-
rectly or through reduced compensation.5s In such cases, a noncompe-
tition agreement serves as an effective long-term contract between
55. Callahan, supra note 23, at 717; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 39, at 96.
56. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) ("The undoubted aim of the Thir-
teenth Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery
but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States."); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1894). The court in American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Wolf succinctly summarized the development of this
principle:
Courts of equity historically have refused to order an individual to perform a
contract for personal services. Originally this rule evolved because of the inher-
ent difficulties courts would encounter in supervising the performance of
uniquely personal efforts. During the Civil War era, there emerged a more com-
pelling reason for not directing the performance of personal services: the Thir-
teenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. It has been strongly
suggested that judicial compulsion of services would violate the express com-
mand of that amendment. For practical, policy and constitutional reasons, there-
fore, courts continue to decline to affirmatively enforce employment contracts.
420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted).
57. The airline industry avoids this problem altogether; most pilots receive their train-
ing in the Air Force and later join private industry. Callahan, supra note 23, at 717.
58. Economists have studied why capital markets fail to provide financing for individ-
uals who are capable of making an efficient investment in education and training. For a
brief summary of why the capital market fails in this regard, see LESTER C. THUROW, IN-
VESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 77-78 (1970).
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employer and employee, assuring the firm that it will have time to
recoup its investment.5 9
Most noncompetition agreements, however, provide that if the em-
ployee ever leaves the firm, the noncompetition restrictions will apply.
Let us call these infinite noncompetition agreements. Even though the em-
ployment contract or the courts will limit the duration of the restrictions
once the employee has left the firm, these agreements are infinite in the
sense that the duration of the restrictions does not begin until the em-
ployee has left. This means that no matter how many years the em-
ployee serves his firm, he still faces a severe burden upon termination of
his employment.
Infinite noncompetition agreements are not necessary to support
efficient, long-term investment in training. In fact, one would expect
that in a world of perfect information, bargaining would lead to con-
tracts specifying that if the employee left the firm within X years, he
would not be allowed to compete, where X years of service at an express
or implied wage of $Y was a period sufficient for the firm to recoup its
investment in training. Let us call these limited noncompetition agreements.
60
Suppose, as in an earlier example, that it costs $300,000 per year
for three years to train an airline pilot. It may be that, given a pilot's
value to an airline during and after training, an airline will recoup its
investment in ten years if it pays a pilot a salary of $70,000 per year for
ten years. After implicitly or explicitly assuring a prospective pilot of
such a salary, an efficient employment agreement would therefore pro-
vide that if the pilot leaves the airline within ten years he will not work
for a competitor. As long as the pilot can earn no more in some other
line of work, the airline need not fear that the pilot will quit during the
ten-year duration of the limited noncompetition agreement.
One could design an infinite noncompetition agreement for the
above example that would also be fair. It might be that, given the aver-
age starting pilot's life expectancy, an airline that paid for the cost of
training would, on average, recoup its investment if it paid a pilot a sal-
ary of $85,000 for the rest of his career. While infinite noncompetition
agreements are not necessarily inefficient, it can be concluded that they
are unnecessary, for one could always design a limited noncompetition
agreement that would induce the optimum investment in training.
If the reason for a whole class of noncompetition agreements is that
they are needed to induce investment in training, then it is curious that
almost all noncompetition agreements appear to be of the infinite vari-
59. The traditional legal doctrine in this area, supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text,
does not include consideration of the employer's investment in training. Rubin and
Shedd, supra note 39, argue that the courts act in a manner that takes employer investment
in training into account even though a different rationale is put forth.
60. Both Rubin and Shedd, supra note 39, and Callahan, supra note 23, argue that
noncompetition agreements enable efficient investment in human capital. Neither recog-
nizes, however, that infinite noncompetition agreements are not needed to induce employer in-
vestment and in fact may be detrimental to employees who lack the information required
to make long-term contracts concerning their productivity.
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ety.6 1 For the same reasons discussed in the section evaluating em-
ployee goodwill, it is reasonable to conclude that employees are at
particular risk of making sub-optimal contracts when they make long-
term decisions involving their future productivity. That is, an employee
is in a bad position to evaluate his current and future value and is, there-
fore, highly likely to strike a bad bargain with a firm operating with fuller
information.
Given that limited noncompetition agreements can be used to in-
duce efficient levels of training, there is no reason to allow infinite non-
competition agreements if their purpose is to induce investment in
human capital. A statute that limits the duration of a noncompetition
agreement to, say, six years of service with a firm (after which the non-
competition covenant would expire), and requires the firm to make
some showing of how it calculated training costs and derived a reason-
able noncompetition term, would go far toward protecting employees.
Colorado seems to follow this logic by making all employee noncompe-
tition agreements unlawful except for those that provide for the recov-
ery of the expense of educating and training an employee who has
served the employer for less than two years.
6 2
D. Implicit Contracts to Stabilize Wages
In a labor market characterized by perfect competition, the equilib-
rium wage will equal the marginal revenue product of labor. The MRP
depends, in turn, on the price that the product sells for, the quantity
sold and the cost of other inputs. Because these characteristics fluctuate
constantly, especially over the term of a business cycle, labor's marginal
revenue product fluctuates constantly. In a perfect market in which la-
bor is sold as in a spot auction, wages should therefore move up and
down frequently.
In fact, most workers' wages remain fairly stable. Rather than aban-
doning the spot auction model, however, many economists have theo-
rized that stable wages may be the result of optimizing behavior between
risk averse workers and risk neutral firms.6 3 Workers are averse to hav-
ing their wages fluctuate and would prefer a stable wage that has the
same present value as a fluctuating stream. Firms, or their stockholders,
can diversify their sources of income and rely on capital markets more
readily; for this reason, firms are risk neutral and are willing to make
actuarially fair bets. One economist summarized the potential gain from
trade in this way:
By agreeing to accept some of the risk of wage variation,
employers implicitly offer an insurance service to workers. This
61. Almost all cases that are litigated involve infinite noncompetition agreements. It
is possible that limited noncompetition agreements are often used but don't lead to litiga-
tion. This seems unlikely, however, since the courts and commentators rarely consider
limited noncompetition agreements when discussing the issue.
62. COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
63. Mark P. Taylor, The Simple Analytics ofImplicit Labour Contracts, 39 BULL. ECON. RES.
1 (1987).
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is attractive to workers because of their risk aversion and is rel-
atively costless to the firm because of its risk neutrality. Thus,
"Risk-reducing policies are the cheapest and hence most profit-
able way of attracting any given work force." 64
The arrangement between the firm and the employee has been
called an implicit contract by economists because one rarely sees an ac-
tual long-term contract spelling out the wages that the employee will
receive. If these implicit arrangements do exist, perhaps one reason
they are never subject to contractual agreements is that it is too difficult
to state ahead of time the exact manner in which a worker's lifetime
wages will be smoothed out. A worker's wage will still vary as his pro-
ductivity changes (e.g., he is promoted to a higher position) and as the
long-term health of the industry changes. What is filtered out by an im-
plicit contract is short-term changes in the productivity of labor result-
ing from "noise"-in the market.
An employee may be willing to enter into this arrangement with a
firm based on the firm's reputation. That is, an employee may be willing
to accept a wage that is temporarily below his marginal revenue product
because the firm has a reputation for maintaining stable wages. This
reputation is valuable in attracting new workers and so the employee is
fairly assured that the firm will not renege by lowering the wage when
the productivity of labor temporarily falls.
But what stops an employee from reneging on his end of the agree-
ment? An employee earning a stable wage above his MRP from firm A
could, when his MRP rises above that stable wage, move to firm B, which
pays its workers a fluctuating wage tied to worker productivity. Workers
do need to protect their reputation because firms that pay stable wages
will be wary of workers who change jobs frequently. An employee can,
however, mask the fact that he is reneging on a stable wage arrange-
ment, whereas a firm generally cannot. Employees can cite a multitude
of reasons for leaving a firm-geographic preference, dissatisfaction
with management, a desire for a slightly different job or work environ-
ment, etc.
Thus, the argument goes, the firm wants some assurance that the
worker is making a long-term commitment. A noncompetition agree-
ment, by essentially binding the employee to the firm, serves as an effec-
tive commitment and thus induces the firm to enter the optimizing
arrangement of stable wages.
Upon closer examination, however, this argument fails. Both the-
ory and causal empiricism suggest that an employee has no need to
make a long-term commitment to a firm in order to enter a stable wage
arrangement. Assuming that most workers are risk averse, all firms
would offer implicit, stable wages. That is, it would be in no firm's inter-
est to offer fluctuating wages, because the firm would not be able to
attract workers. Therefore, a firm that offers stable wages need not fear
64. Id. at 4 (citing Martin N. Baily, Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand, 41
REv. ECON. STUD. 37 (1974)).
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that a worker will be motivated to leave to take advantage of wages that
are temporarily higher at a competitor that pays fluctuating wages. This
explains why stable wages are the norm in most labor markets, including
those in which noncompetition agreements are not typical (e.g., food ser-
vice, janitors, librarians and guards).65 Thus, it is unlikely that noncom-
petition agreements facilitate implicit contracts relating to stable wages.
A review of the cases and the literature reveals no instance in which
implicit contracts were cited as a potential justification for enforcing a
noncompetition agreement. This is not surprising. The implicit ar-
rangement does not fit the legal requirements of a contract (a meeting
of the minds, offer and acceptance or identifiable consideration). Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely that a firm would argue that it is obligated to pay
employees a certain implied wage, even if this lends credence to the
firm's effort to enforce a particular noncompetition agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Paper has examined four potentially welfare-enhancing bar-
gains between employer and employee that have been said to explain
the existence of employee noncompetition agreements. Those bargains
involved employee goodwill, the disclosure of business secrets, invest-
ment in expensive training and stable wages. A close economic analysis
of these potential gains revealed the following:
1. Noncompetition agreements should not be enforced when the
sole justification by the employer is the need to protect his interest in
employee goodwill-that is, in revenue that depends upon the worker's
continued employment, such as the revenue a worker generates through
close customer contact. In a perfect market an employee will earn a
wage equal to his marginal revenue product, including revenue gener-
ated by the goodwill the employee develops. If an employee is being
compensated on this basis, a firm need not fear that he will leave. The
fact that many employees do enter noncompetition agreements related
to employee goodwill indicates that employees systematically underesti-
mate their long-term value and enter sub-optimal long-term agreements
because of asymmetric information in the labor market.
2. A noncompetition agreement induces a firm to disclose business
secrets to employees. This disclosure enables an expansion in output,
and, hence, an increase in the firm's profits. Part of the increase in prof-
its will be used to compensate employees for giving up a large degree of
mobility. Thus, in a perfect labor market, a noncompetition agreement
related to business secrets will enhance the welfare of the contracting
parties. There is strong reason to believe, however, that labor markets
are not perfect and that employees make sub-optimal long-term agree-
ments due to asymmetric information about their productivity.
When a noncompetition agreement is related to the disclosure of
business secrets, the effect on the market is indeterminate. These agree-
65. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 39, at 99.
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ments encourage firms to develop and exploit secrets, but they also in-
troduce monopoly pricing. Net social welfare will increase in some
instances and decrease in others.
3. An employer will expend large amounts of time and resources
teaching an employee general skills only if the employer can be assured
that the employee will not leave the firm to join a competitor shortly
after the end of the training period. By prohibiting attractive employ-
ment options, noncompetition agreements effectively bind an employee
to the firm and can thus induce investment in training. But most non-
competition agreements are of unlimited duration in the sense that they
do not expire after a given period of employment. Under such agree-
ments, an employee's mobility is restricted no matter how long he has
served his employer. A noncompetition agreement that expires after a
reasonable period of employment (a period long enough for the firm to
recoup its investment in training) will also induce expensive training of
employees. Such an agreement has the benefit of permitting the em-
ployee to leave and immediately assume a competitive position after
serving his employer for a reasonable period of time.
4. It is unlikely that implicit arrangements between a firm and its
workers to stabilize wages give rise to employee noncompetition agree-
ments. Employees have no need to bind themselves to employers to
induce stable wages.
Given the above, a rational legal regime should hold noncompeti-
tion agreements enforceable only under the following circumstances.
First, a noncompetition agreement would be appropriate when the em-
ployer spends direct and quantifiable funds educating employees and
needs assurance that the firm will be able to recoup that investment over
time. The burden should be on the firm to show that the duration of the
restriction is reasonable in light of the direct investment in training.
Once an employee has served the employer for a reasonable period in
light of the training costs, the employee should be free to join competi-
tors without further restrictions. Second, a noncompetition agreement
would be enforceable when the firm has trade secrets of substantial
value which are routinely taught to employees. To prevent employees
from making sub-optimal long-term commitments, the duration of non-
competition agreements should be limited by statute. For example, a
statute could require that these restrictive covenants expire within a def-
inite period not to exceed six years. Six years after entering an agree-
ment containing a noncompetition covenant, the covenant would expire
and the employee would have an opportunity to renegotiate the agree-
ment. Such a rule would protect employees and have no other serious
effect on welfare.
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